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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Galvan argued that the prosecutor violated both 
Mr. Galvan's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by arguing that the jury could use 
his post-Miranda 1 silence to infer evidence of his guile This brief is necessary to 
respond to the State's assertion that Mr. Galvan waived his right to remain silent when 
he voluntary provided statements to the police. In response, Mr. Galvan argues that the 
case law relied on by the State is distinguishable because the issue in those cases is 
whether a criminal suspect sufficiently invoked the Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent as to require the police to terminate an interrogation. The State's authority does 
not deal with Mr. Galvan's specific argument that the use of his post-Miranda silence as 
evidence of his guilt violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Galvan's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 Mr. Galvan did not object to the prosecutors statement at trial and raised this issue for 
the first time on appeal under the fundamental error test set forth by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (Idaho 2010) 
1 
ISSUES 
1) Did the prosecuting attorney violate Mr. Galvan's Fifth Amendment rights when, 
without objection, he elicited testimony as to Mr. Galvan's post-arrest, post-
Miranda silence and commented on that silence in his closing argument? 
2) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
ten years, with one and one-half years fixed, for aggravated assault and the 
deadly weapons enhancement and a concurrent sentence of four years, with one 
and one-half years fixed, for stalking in the first degree?3 




The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Galvan's Fifth Amendment Rights When, Without 
Objection, He Elicited Testimony As To Mr. Galvan's Post-Arrest, Post-Miranda Silence 
And Commented On That Silence In His Closing Argument 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Mr. Galvan failed to establish the 
first prong of the fundamental error test pronounced in Perry, because Mr. Galvan 
waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-8.) In 
support of its assertion, the State relies on Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, , 
130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010), for the proposition that a criminal suspect must unambiguously 
invoke the right to remain silent. While the State accurately states the holding from 
Berghuis, the case is distinguishable because the question presented was whether 
Thompkins' silence for a period of approximately three hours constituted a sufficient 
means to invoke his Fifth Amendment right and required the police to stop the 
interrogation. In other words, the case focused on the point in time when an 
interrogation must cease. According to the Berghuis Court that invocation must be 
unambiguous because police officers need a clear indication that they cannot ask the 
defendant any more questions. 
However, Berghuis is not applicable in this case because Mr. Galvan is not 
seeking the suppression of statements. The question in this case is whether 
Mr. Galvan's decision to not answer a question during an interrogation can be 
subsequently used by the State during closing as evidence of his guilt. As stated in the 
Appellant's Brief, (Appellant's Breif, pp.7-10), Mr. Galvan's primary argument relies on 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), where the United States Supreme Court held that 
3 
silence in the wake of the Miranda warnings "may be nothing more than the arrestee's 
exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous 
because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested." Id. at. 617. The 
Doyle Court went on to hold that it would be "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of 
due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used" against him/her at trial. 
Id. at 618. As such, the Berghuis opinion is distinguishable from this case because 
Berghuis stands for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent must 
be unambiguously invoked, while the Doyle opinion stands for the proposition that post-
Miranda silence is inherently ambiguous and due to that ambiguity the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process right to a fair trial would be violated if that silence was used 
against the defendant. 
The State also cites to Salinas v. Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2174 (2013), for the 
proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination must be affirmatively invoked. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) However, that case dealt with non-custodial interrogation, 
and the United State's Supreme Court expressly distinguished Salinas from Miranda 
and its progeny on that basis. Id. at 2180. In fact, the Salinas Court drew the very 
same distinction argued by Mr. Galvan. In that case, Salinas argued for the Court to 
adopt an exception to the Rule in Berghuis which requires a criminal defendant to 
unambiguously invoke the Fifth Amendment right to silence. The Salinas Court 
employed the following rationale in rejecting that exception: 
Petitioner's proposed exception would also be very difficult to 
reconcile with Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 
L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010). There, we held in the closely related context of post-
Miranda silence that a defendant failed to invoke the privilege when he 
refused to respond to police questioning for 2 hours and 45 minutes. 560 
U.S., at --, 130 S.Ct., at 2256-57, 2259-60. If the extended custodial 
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silence in that case did not invoke the privilege, then surely the 
momentary silence in this case did not do so either. 
Petitioner and the dissent attempt to distinguish Berghuis by 
observing that it did not concern the admissibility of the defendant's 
silence but instead involved the admissibility of his subsequent 
statements. But regardless of whether prosecutors seek to use silence or 
a confession that follows, the logic of Berghuis applies with equal force: A 
suspect who stands mute has not done enough to put police on notice that 
he is relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege.FN3 
FN3. Petitioner is correct that due process prohibits 
prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was 
silent after he heard Miranda warnings, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610, 617-618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), but 
that rule does not apply where a suspect has not received 
the warnings' implicit promise that any silence will not be 
used against him,[4J Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,240, 
100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). 
Id. at 2182. (citation omitted) (original emphasis). According to the State's own 
authority, the Berghuis opinion's requirement that a defendant unambiguously invoke 
the right to remain silent is distinguishable from this case because that invocation 
requirement deals with a direct Fifth Amendment violation and not the derivative 
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation claimed by Mr. Galvan. 
The State also argues that Mr. Galvan waived his Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent when he began answering questions proffered by law enforcement. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6.) Contrary to the State's position, the foregoing case law 
does not require a defendant to affirmatively invoke the Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent in order for the defendant to argue that use of post-custody, post-Miranda silence 
violated his/her Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. This position comports with 
4 However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that, in Idaho, "a defendant's right to 
remain silent attaches upon custody, not arrest or interrogation, and thus a prosecutor 
may not use any post-custody silence to infer guilt in its case-in-chief." State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 (2011). 
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the Doyle holding which forbids the State's use of post-Miranda silence because it is 
inherently ambiguous as to its meaning and it is, therefore, inherently unfair to use it to 
infer guilt. While Mr. Galvan is not aware of any Idaho case law directly on pOint,5 the 
Tenth Circuit has held that when a defendant answers some questions and refuses to 
answer others, or in other words is partially silent, this "partial silence does not preclude 
him from claiming a violation of his due process rights under Doyle." U.S. v. 
Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483, 486 (10th Cir. 1993). This is consistent with other Idaho 
case law which precludes the use of silence at trial unless that State introduces it for the 
limited purposes of impeachment. See Ellington, supra; See also State v. Dougherty, 
142 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2005). 
In sum, the State's authority is inapposite because it deals with the question of 
whether a defendant sufficiently invoked the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent as 
to require the police to cease an interrogation. Mr. Galvan is arguing that there is flat 
prohibition against using a defendant's post-custody silence for the purpose of inferring 
guilt based on a Fourteen Amendment due process claim which is derived from the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent. 
5 According to the State, State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 524-525 (2002), stands for the 
proposition "reinvocation of Miranda rights after waiver must be 'clear and ambiguous.'" 
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) However, that case dealt with the questions of whether a 
juvenile actually waived his right to silence and whether, after speaking with the police 
on a few occasions, his mother's statement "the Miranda rights state he had a right to 
[an attorney]," was an unambiguous request by his mother for an attorney. Id. Contrary 
to the State's characterization of the holding in Doe, that case does not deal with the 
question of whether a defendant's decision to refuse to answer a specific question 
proffered by law enforcement after Miranda warnings can be subsequently introduced at 
trial as evidence of guilt. If fact, Doe makes no reference to Doyle or due process 
because it is a case dealing solely with the Fifth Amendment not a post-Miranda use of 
silence due process issue. As such, the State's reliance on Doe is misplaced. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Galvan respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, 
Mr. Galvan respectfully requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portions of his 
sentences. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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